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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of Disorderly Conduct, a class C 
misdemeanor violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-102, in the Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County, the Honorable Mark DeCaria, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e)(2010). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff/appellee is in agreement with the defendant/appellant's statement 
of the issues on appeal and standards of review, as outlined in the Brief of Appellant. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CONST, art. 1, § 1 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend 
their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to 
worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble 
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of 
grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, 
being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6a-102. Motor Vehicles - Traffic Code -
Definitions. 
(42) "Pedestrian" means a person traveling: (a) on foot; or (b) 
in a wheelchair. 
(44) "Person" means every natural person, firm, 
copartnership, association, or corporation. 
(62) "Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, 
vehicles, and other conveyances either singly or together while using 
any highway for the purpose of travel. 
(72) "Vehicle" means a device in, on, or by which a person or 
property is or may be transported or drawn on a highway, except 
devices used exclusively on stationary rails or tracks. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-308 Lane use control signals 
The operator of a vehicle facing a traffic-control signal placed 
to control individual lane use shall obey the signal as follows: 
(1) Green signal - vehicular traffic may travel in any lane over 
which a green signal is shown. 
(2) Steady yellow signal - - vehicular traffic is warned that 
lane control change is being made. 
(3) Steady red signal - - vehicular traffic may not enter or 
travel in any lane over which a red signal is shown. 
(4) Flashing yellow signal - - vehicular traffic may use the lane 
only for the purpose of approaching and making a left turn. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-906 Designation of through highways 
A highway authority, with reference to highways under its 
jurisdiction, may erect and maintain stop signs, yield signs, or other 
traffic-control devices to designate: 
(1) through highways; or 
(2) intersections or other roadway junctions at which 
vehicular traffic on one or more of the roadways should yield or stop 
and yield before entering the intersection or junction 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-3-504(l) Traffic ordinances on school 
property 
(1) A local political subdivision in which real property is 
located that belongs to, or is controlled by, the State Board of 
Education, a local board of education, an area vocational center, or 
the Schools for the Deaf and the Blind may, at the request of the 
responsible board of education or institutional council, adopt 
ordinances for the control of vehicular traffic on that property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-406. Force in defense of property 
(1) A person is justified in using force, other than deadly force, 
against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably 
believes that force is necessary to prevent or terminate another 
person's criminal interference with real property or personal 
property: 
(a) Lawfully in the person's possession; 
(b) Lawfully in the possession of a member of the person's 
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immediate family; or 
(c) Belonging to a person whose property the person has a 
legal duty to protect. 
(2) In determining reasonableness under Subsection (1), the 
trier of fact shall, in addition to any other factors, consider the 
following factors: 
(a) The apparent or perceived extent of the damage to the 
property; 
(b) Property damage previously caused by the other person; 
(c) Threats of personal injury or damage to property that have 
been made previously by the other person; and 
(d) Any patterns of abuse or violence between the person and 
the other person. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-102. Disorderly Conduct 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct, if: 
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to 
move from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or 
physically offensive condition, by any act which serves no 
legitimate purpose; or 
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or 
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or 
threatening behavior; 
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can 
be heard in a public place; or 
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged by Information with one count of Disorderly 
Conduct, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-102, and one 
count of Criminal Trespass, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-6-206(2)(a). R. 9. Subsequently, an amended information was filed to amend 
the Disorderly Conduct count to specifically allege violations of the subsections 
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prohibiting unreasonable noises in a public place and obstruction of vehicular or 
pedestrian traffic. R. 16. 
Conviction. Following a jury trial that lasted approximately six hours, 
Defendant was found guilty of Disorderly Conduct and acquitted of Criminal 
Trespass. R. 73. 
Sentence. Defendant waived the right to be sentenced at a later date. 
Accordingly, the court sentenced Defendant to: serve 90 days in the Davis County 
Jail with 90 days suspended, successfully complete 12 months on informal court 
probation with no further violations of law, pay a $200 fine, and complete an anger 
management class. R. 73. 
Timely Appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
It is well established appellate practice that a brief should recite the facts in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of the trial court. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 
15T[2.114P.3d551. 
On May 22, 2009, Haley Bruce was trying to find the Salt City Pizza Company 
on Gentile Street, in Layton. R. 87 at 51. After driving past the area where she 
believed the business to be located, she pulled her car into a parking lot and parked. 
Id. at 51-52. The parking lot belonged to the Costume Castle and had no trespassing 
signs posted in various locations. Id. at 25. Ms. Bruce got out of her vehicle, still 
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looking for the pizza place, and began to walk east and then west along the block 
before finally finding, and entering the pizza place. Id. at 52. 
While Ms. Bruce was paying for her pizza, Defendant swung the Salt City Pizza 
door open and started yelling profanities at her. Id. Defendant had seen Ms. Bruce 
park in Defendant's private parking lot, and walk over to the Salt City Pizza 
Company. Id. at 95. Ms. Bruce and Defendant did not know each other prior to this 
incident. Id. at 52. Defendant entered the store, upset at Ms. Bruce for parking in 
the Defendant's parking lot. Id. at 37. Salt City Pizza employee, Randall Hunt, 
testified that Defendant started screaming profanities when she first opened the 
door and then continued screaming at Ms. Bruce as she entered the building. Id. at 
38. Mr. Hunt testified that the now frightened Ms. Bruce, was apologizing and 
backing away from Defendant and bumped into the soda machine. Id. at 39. Mr. 
Hunt told Defendant two or three times to leave. Id. When she did not respond to 
his requests, he finally told her that if she didn't leave he would call the police. Id. 
Only then did Defendant leave the building. Id. at 38. 
Ms. Bruce quickly finished getting her pizza and proceeded to leave. Id. at 54. 
Outside the pizza place she encountered Defendant again. Id. Defendant was 
filming Ms. Bruce and yelling all sorts of profanities, calling her names and 
screaming at Ms. Bruce to get off the property. Id. Still apologizing, Ms. Bruce 
hurriedly got into her car, reversed out of the parking spot and attempted to drive 
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towards an exit/entrance. Id. Defendant then stepped in front of the vehicle, 
preventing Ms. Bruce from exiting the parking lot. Id. 
The parking lot had two entrances, one on the west side of the parking lot and 
one on the east side. Id. at 22. Ms. Bruce initially entered the parking lot through 
the east entrance, from Gentile Street. Id. Layton City Police Officer Wesley 
McKinney, described Gentile Street as an extremely busy road with limited visibility. 
Id. at 33-34. For someone to back onto Gentile from that parking area, their vehicle 
would have to enter the lane of travel before being able to see if it is completely 
clear. Id. at 34-35. 
Ms. Bruce was unable to reverse for fear of backing into oncoming traffic and 
unable to move forward to exit through the west exit/entrance because Defendant 
was in front of her vehicle. Id. at 54. Ms. Bruce felt trapped. Id. Ms. Bruce pleaded 
with Defendant to move so she could return to work. Id. at 55. Defendant told Ms. 
Bruce that neither of them was going anywhere. Id. Defendant demanded that Ms. 
Bruce had to back out of the parking lot the same way she entered, instead of 
proceeding to the west exit/entrance. Id. at 101. Ms. Bruce called the police for 
assistance. Id. at 56. Defendant testified that Ms. Bruce "inched forward" with her 
car and knocked Defendant down. Id. at 101. No other witness provided testimony 
to support this allegation. 
Officer McKinney, responded to the scene. Id. at 12. He testified that 
Defendant was very agitated and yelling about people trespassing on her property. 
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Id. at 20. He also testified that her yelling was in a manner where it was drowning 
everybody else out and it was fairly difficult to get her to calm down enough to 
speak with her. Id. at 20-22. 
Defendant was charged by Information with one count of Disorderly Conduct, 
a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-102, and one count of 
Criminal Trespass, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
206(2)(a). R. 9. Subsequently, on March 9,2009, an amended information was filed 
to amend the Disorderly Conduct count to specifically allege violations of the 
subsections prohibiting unreasonable noises in a public place and obstruction of 
vehicular or pedestrian traffic. R. 16. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-102(l)(b)(ii) & 
(iv). Defendant was found guilty of Disorderly Conduct and acquitted of Criminal 
Trespass. R. 73. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court did not err by denying the request to instruct the jury on 
the meaning of 'traffic' or by denying Defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict. 
2. Defendant's conviction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-102(l)(b)(iii) was 
proper because the statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad in 
its prohibition of unreasonable noises. 
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3. The trial court properly denied the request to instruct the jury that 
Defendant had the right to protect her private property where no damage 
or threat of damage to the property existed. 
4. The trial court properly denied the request to instruct the jury that 
Defendant's intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm 
must have been the predominant intent to be found guilty of disorderly 
conduct. 
ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT L 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING THE REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY ON THE MEANING OF 'TRAFFIC OR BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT. 
The trial court's decision to deny the request to instruct the jury on the 
meaning of 'traffic' was correct. Defendant's use of non-binding authority is 
unpersuasive as other sections of the Utah Code provide ample instruction on the 
definition of'traffic/ Utah's statute provides that a person is guilty of disorderly 
conduct if intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-102(l)(b)(iv). Although Title 76 of the Utah Criminal Code 
does not define 'traffic,' it is defined within Title 41 of the Motor Vehicle Act to 
include "vehicles, and other conveyances either singly or together." UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 41-6a-102(62) (emphasis added). Additionally, 'pedestrian' is defined as "a 
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person" and Vehicle' is defined as "a device" which both apply to a singular form of 
the category being referenced. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6a-102(42) & (72). "The 
plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in 
harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under 
the same and related chapters." State v, MacGuire, 2004 UT 4,84 P.3d 1171 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
The definition of 'traffic/ as seen in other statutes under related chapters, is 
used to encompass both the single vehicle as well as a multiple vehicles. For 
example, the statute governing lane use control signals found in UTAH CODE ANN. § 
41-6a-308, states: 
The operator of a vehicle facing a traffic-control signal placed 
to control individual lane use shall obey the signal as follows: 
(1) Green signal - vehicular traffic may travel in any lane over 
which a green signal is shown. 
(2) Steady yellow signal - - vehicular traffic is warned that 
lane control change is being made. 
(3) Steady red signal - - vehicular traffic may not enter or 
travel in any lane over which a red signal is shown. 
(4) Flashing yellow signal - - vehicular traffic may use the lane 
only for the purpose of approaching and making a left turn. 
The application of Vehicular traffic' in this statute is clearly applicable to a single 
vehicle encountering the traffic light, as well as multiple vehicles. In addition, the 
statute governing traffic control devices, found in UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-906(2) 
states: 
A highway authority, with reference to highways under its 
jurisdiction, may erect and maintain stop signs, yield signs, or 
other traffic-control devices to designate: 
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(1) through highways; or 
(2) intersections or other roadway junctions at which 
vehicular traffic on one or more of the roadways should yield 
or stop and yield before entering the intersection or junction. 
Again, this statute is clearly applicable whether a single vehicle or multiple vehicles 
must make the stop or yield as required by the sign. 
Title 41 is not the only place where 'traffic' is used generally and applicable to 
a single vehicle. Similar to Title 76, the State System of Public Education section of 
the Utah Code does not define 'traffic,' within the title. However, in UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 53A-3-504(l), it provides that: 
"(1) A local political subdivision in which real property is 
located that belongs to, or is controlled by, the State Board of 
Education,... may, at the request of the responsible board of 
education or institutional council, adopt ordinances for the 
control of vehicular traffic on that property." 
The application of this statute, again, clearly applies to a single vehicle violating the 
adopted ordinance as much as it would multiple vehicles. 
Defendant supports her argument, that 'traffic' involves more than 
interference with a single vehicle, with citations from State v. Anonymous, 363 A.2d 
772 (Conn. C. P. 1976) and Seymour v. Seymour, 289 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
1968). The cases are not Utah cases; rather they are from Connecticut and New 
York and are not binding authorities. Where the Utah Code contains definitions and 
application of the term 'traffic' throughout the Code, those definitions should 
likewise be applicable in this case. 
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Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances in the Anonymous and Seymour 
cases are distinguishable with the facts of the current case, In the Anonymous case, 
the court held that a violation of the disorderly conduct statute had not occurred 
when the defendant prevented the complainant from exiting his vehicle. 363 A.2d 
772 at 98. The defendant approached the complainant to sell a newspaper and 
solicit support for a radical political party. Id. at 94. Even after the complainant 
declined, the defendant persisted in his solicitation. Id. Ultimately bothered by the 
communist inferences contained in the paper being sold, the complainant reported 
the conduct to the police. Id. at 96. Nonetheless, "[t]he complainant had rolled 
down his window," "persisted in trading comments with the defendant," and failed 
to signal, at any time, that the conversation had ended." Id. at 97. 
In the current case, Defendant's approach to Ms. Bruce consisted of yelling 
and profanities, rather than a persistent solicitation of support. R. 87 at 53. In 
response, Ms. Bruce repeatedly apologized, got into her car and tried to leave until 
Defendant stopped her by standing in front of her vehicle. Id at 54. Defendant was 
not merely expressing an unpopular opinion for which her right to free speech 
protected her. Instead, she continuously engaged in yelling at Ms. Bruce and 
prevented her from driving out of the parking lot despite her efforts to do so, 
quickly and safely. Id. 
In the Seymour case, the defendant was the complainant's estranged husband 
and the matter came before the New York Family Court which had jurisdiction over 
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acts between spouses or other members of the same family. 289 N.Y.S.2d 515 at 
517. The court noted that where the intent and purpose of the disorderly conduct 
statute seemed to apply to "public situations where the public peace and decorum 
are threatened," the case before the court involved allegations "of a private nature, 
that of the respondent directing his hostile conduct towards the petitioner and her 
children." Id. at 518. The court further distinguished the allegation of disorderly 
conduct from the statute by defining a "tyPe of conduct" relating to "highways or 
thoroughfares for extended periods of time." Id. 
Although the definition created in support of the New York court's holding in 
this case is helpful to illustrate its reasoning for the holding in the Seymour case, 
Appellee would argue that such a broad and dramatic black letter definition was not 
necessarily the court's intent. If it were to be imposed on all future interpretations 
of the statute, it would, among other circumstances, exclude application of the 
statute to a public incident, between strangers, that interrupted traffic on a smaller 
road for only a brief period of time. Logically, in reading the plain language of the 
statute, this hypothetical should not be summarily dismissed under the proposed 
definition. 
Additionally, and in contrast to the Seymour case, Defendant was not related 
to Ms. Bruce, did not know Ms. Bruce and was not involved in domestic litigation 
with Ms. Bruce. R. 87 at 52-3. Indeed, the altercation between them was not a 
private matter in any way, as was the case in Seymour. Instead, it occurred between 
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complete strangers, in a business open to the public and could have involved any 
member of the public, not limited specifically to Ms. Bruce. 
"Doubt [should not be injected] as to the meaning of words where no doubt 
would be felt by the normal reader." State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, T[18, 84 P.3d 
1171. Rather, "[i]n considering the meaning of a [statutory] provision,... [w]e need 
not look beyond the plain language unless we find some ambiguity in it." Id. at ^ [15 
(citation omitted). Moreover, "[t]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a 
whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same 
statute and with other statutes under the same and related chapters." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
The plain language and definitions contained in UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-61-
102(62) provides sufficient meaning to the term 'traffic' and includes a single 
vehicle as defined therein. A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction which 
"does not comport with the facts presented or does not accurately state the 
applicable law." Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003,1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the request to issue 
an additional jury instruction based on the interpretations of non-binding authority 
and properly denied Defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
ARGUMENT II. 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-102(l)(b)(iii) WAS 
PROPER BECAUSE THE STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE OR 
OVERBROAD IN ITS PROHIBITION OF UNREASONABLE NOISES. 
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Defendant's argument that the disorderly conduct statute is 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad in its prohibition of unreasonable noises is 
without merit as it is based upon language in case law that has since been 
eliminated from the Utah Code. "A statute is presumed constitutional, and we 
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." State v. Norhs, 2007 UT 
6, T[ 10,152 P.3d 293. A law is "unconstitutional if it is so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 
1085,1088 (Utah 1981). Those challenging the constitutionality of a statute "bear a 
heavy burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality." State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 
4, ^[8,84 P.3d 1171. Moreover, legislative enactments are presumed valid and the 
courts "will not strike down a legislative act unless that act is clearly in conflict with 
the higher law as set forth in the Constitution." State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220,1222 
(Utah 1983). 
Logan City v. Huber came before the Court of Appeals of Utah in 1990, 
wherein 'obscene' or 'abusive' language in a municipal ordinance was struck down. 
786 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Huber, the defendant was charged with 
disorderly conduct pursuant to the city ordinance prohibiting "abusive or obscene 
language ... in a public place." Id. at 1374. Huber engaged in shouting vulgarities at 
police officers during a traffic stop. Id. at 1373. The ordinance was held to be 
unconstitutionally overbroad on its face, because it criminalized speech. Id. at 1374. 
Defendant bases their argument on this holding and applies it to the current 
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disorderly conduct statute. Br. Aplt at 13. However, the language referenced in 
Huber was eliminated from the statute in 1999. 
During the 1999 General Session of the Legislature of the state of Utah, House 
Bill 217 was introduced and ultimately enrolled as the current disorderly conduct 
statute.1 Aside from minor formatting changes, the only amendment to the statue 
was the elimination of what was formerly subsection (iv), which preceded the 
current subsection (iv). The eliminated subsection provided that, in addition to the 
statutory provisions of the current statute, anyone who "engages in abusive or 
obscene language or makes obscene gestures in a public place" would be guilty of 
disorderly conduct. Id. The amendment was made "in compliance with a Utah 
Supreme Court ruling." Id. The 'unreasonable noise' provisions of the statute 
previously in place during the 1999 General Session, remain in place today. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-102(l)(b)(ii) & (iii). 
In the current case, the disorderly conduct provision does not seek to 
criminalize protected speech; rather it seeks to criminalize "unreasonable noises in 
a public place." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-102 (l)(b)(iv). Defendant was charged 
under this provision for her conduct that began in the Salt City Pizza Company, 
continued outside and ended up in a parking lot. R. 87 at 72 & 53-54. Although, as 
testimony revealed, Defendant did use profane language when confronting Ms. 
Bruce, the 'unreasonable noises' consisted of Defendant "yelling" as described by 
1
 Available at http://le.utah.gov/~1999/htmdoc/hbillhtm/HB0217.htm 
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Ms. Bruce while inside the pizza business. Id. at 53. It also included "screaming" in 
a "full-on scream...using her best scream voice, top of her lungs" as testified to by 
Mr. Hunt. Id at 39. Even after Mr. Hunt told Defendant to leave the pizza business 
two or three times, she continued to scream at Ms. Bruce. Id. at 38. It was only after 
Mr. Hunt told Defendant he was going to call the police, that she finally left. Id. 
Furthermore, Defendant initiated the altercation, and persisted to engage in 
unreasonable behavior. Id. This was not a two-way confrontation as occurred in 
Huber where police initiated the contact, Huber responded with yelling profanities, 
and police persisted in their contact to achieve the goal of their investigation. 786 
P.2d 1372,1372-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 
451,461 (1987)(stating that "the First Amendment protects a significant amount of 
verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers"). Rather, Defendant 
confronted Ms. Bruce, a complete stranger to Defendant, R. 87 at 52, and a random 
citizen who parked in Defendant's parking lot, Id. at 95. She then subjected both Ms. 
Bruce, as well as Mr. Hunt, who was working at the time, to her screaming. R. 87 at 
38. 
The jury found that Defendant's conduct, of screaming in a public place, 
constituted unreasonable noise. Id. at 138. As stated by the prosecution during 
closing arguments, "[w]hat's peaceful and dignified at a boxing match and on a 
football field is very different from what's peaceful and dignified in a restaurant." R. 
87 at 136. Even though reasonableness may depend on the circumstances, "a man 
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of common intelligence," In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1981), does not 
have to guess at the meaning of 'reasonable' as applied to the facts of this case. 
The term reasonable is used virtually on an everyday basis and is commonly 
understood, as related to its use. It is a fundamental part of our criminal justice 
system and 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' is the standard of proof required in a 
criminal case. Accordingly, the conviction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-
102(l}(b)(iii) was proper because the statute is not unconstitutionally vague or 
overbroad in its prohibition of unreasonable noises. 
ARGUMENT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT TO PROTECT HER PRIVATE PROPERTY 
WHERE NO DAMAGE OR THREAT OF DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTY EXISTED. 
Defendant argues that she had the right to protect her private property. 
However, her actions are not consistent with Utah law, which enumerates very 
distinct parameters for which a Defendant can justify the exercising of that right. 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property;...." UTAH CONST, art. I, § 1. In 
accordance with that right, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-406(1) provides: 
(1) A person is justified in using force, other than deadly 
force, against another when and to the extent that the person 
reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent or 
terminate another person's criminal interference with real 
property or personal property: 
(a) Lawfully in the person's possession; 
(b) Lawfully in the possession of a member of the person's 
immediate family; or 
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(c) Belonging to a person whose property the person has a 
legal duty to protect. 
However, the right to use force is tempered by a person's reasonable belief that 
force is necessary. Accordingly, the Utah legislature provided a basis for 
determining the reasonableness of using force. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-406(2) 
provides: 
(2) In determining reasonableness under Subsection (1), the 
trier of fact shall, in addition to any other factors, consider the 
following factors: 
(a) The apparent or perceived extent of the damage to the 
property; 
(b) Property damage previously caused by the other person; 
(c) Threats of personal injury or damage to property that have 
been made previously by the other person; and 
(d) Any patterns of abuse or violence between the person and 
the other person. 
Defendant asserts her right to use force in protecting her property and attempts to 
extend that right to include a verbal assault However, Defendant fails to 
acknowledge the statutory parameters set that must be met to justify the right to 
use force. 
In order for Defendant to reasonably believe force is necessary, the court 
must find that either there was "apparent or perceived damage to the property," or 
that previous damage had occurred, threats of injury or damage had been made, or 
previous patterns of abuse or violence existed between the persons involving the 
property at issue. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-406(2). None of these conditions 
existed to support the exercise of this defense by Defendant or to justify a jury 
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instruction to that effect. Indeed, Defendant's testimony did not allege any damage 
to the property, tangible or otherwise. There was no testimony that the parking lot 
was full or that Ms. Bruce was taking a spot away from a paying customer. There 
was no testimony that Ms. Bruce inflicted any physical damage to the property. And 
no testimony that Defendant had any reason to believe that damage would occur. 
Furthermore, Defendant's and Ms. Bruce's testimony wholly lacked any facts to infer 
that they had met before, thus eliminating the possibility that previous damage had 
been inflicted by Ms. Bruce or that she'd been engaged in a pattern of abuse, 
violence or threats towards Defendant. 
Ms. Bruce's efforts to leave the property by driving forward to the west 
exit/entrance would have sufficiently ended any perceived interference with the use 
of Defendant's property. R. 87 at 54-55. Instead, Defendant, herself, invited a 
continued interference by following Ms. Bruce to her car and then standing in front 
of the vehicle in an effort to force Ms. Bruce to back out of the parking lot onto a 
busy road. Id. Defendant asserts through introduction into evidence of a picture, 
that Gentile is not a busy road. R. 87 at 99. The lack of traffic at the moment the 
picture was taken is not indicative of traffic or the potential hazard in backing out 
onto the road. Indeed, there are countless moments when a picture of Interstate 15 
or any other highway could be taken evidencing no traffic, however, that does not 
sufficiently create a basis to state that the highway is not a busy road or that it 
would be prudent to back a vehicle onto it. As Officer McKinney testified, Gentile 
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Street is an "extremely busy" road with "limited visibility," Id at 34, and therefore, it 
was not unreasonable for Ms. Bruce to conclude that exiting from the west was a 
safer course of action. Id. at 54. Had the facts of this case included a grassy area or a 
field of wheat, then logically not only would Ms. Bruce's presence have already 
caused damage, but for her to drive further on the property would have increased 
the damage. But the facts of this case merely involve a paved parking area where no 
damage had occurred and no additional damage would have occurred if Defendant 
had permitted Ms. Bruce to quickly leave as Defendant had initially demanded. 
Accordingly, based on the parameters set by the Utah Code establishing the 
basis for a reasonable belief that force is necessary, Defendant was not entitled to 
application of this statute as a defense and the trial court did not err in denying the 
request for a jury instruction. 
ARGUMENT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT DEFENDANT'S INTENT TO CAUSE PUBLIC INCONVENIENCE, ANNOYANCE 
OR ALARM MUST HAVE BEEN THE PREDOMINANT INTENT TO BE FOUND GUILTY 
OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT. 
Defendant argued that prosecution must prove that her intent to cause public 
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm must have been the predominant intent for her 
actions to support a conviction of disorderly conduct. The judge correctly decided 
that the jury instructions presented at trial sufficiently address the intent element of 
the statute. A defendant is "entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the 
jury in a clear and understandable way." Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 
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1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). However, that does not entitle a defendant to a jury 
instruction which "does not comport with the facts presented or does not accurately 
state the applicable law." Id Additionally, a trial court may properly refuse "a 
proposed instruction if the point is properly covered in the other instructions." State 
v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Defendant did not request an instruction based on Utah law, rather 
Defendant's proffered instruction relied on a Connecticut court's interpretation of a 
similar statute. R. 87 at 83. Specifically, Defendant requested that the specific intent 
of the statute be defined as the predominant intent of her actions. Id. To allow a 
jury instruction based on non-binding authority is to invite any interpretation of law 
from any jurisdiction into the courtroom as the basis to convict or acquit. Such a 
proposition is chaotic in its application and undermines the legislative and judicial 
powers to determine the laws of this state and enforce them, respectively. 
Utah's disorderly conduct statute's provision that, "(1) A person is guilty of 
disorderly conduct if... (b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or 
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof,..." plainly establishes that a defendant 
must intend to cause the elements or recklessly create a risk thereof. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-9-102(l)(b) (emphasis added). Jury Instructions numbered 28 and 29 set out 
the plain language of the statute under which Defendant was charged. R. 22 at No. 
28-29. Subsequently, in jury instruction number 32, the trial court set out the 
definition of a number of terms, for purposes of assisting jurors in their 
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understanding and deliberation of the elements. R. 22 at No. 32. Inclusive in the 
definitions provided was the definition of 'intentionally' and 'recklessly.' Id The 
combination of the statutory language and definitions, sufficiently justified the trial 
court's ruling that "the statute and the language in the jury instructions [spoke] for 
itself." R. 87 at 85. Furthermore, the court properly noted that it was "not going to 
allow Connecticut to make law in Utah." Id 
Defendant had ample opportunity to present her defense theory through 
opening statements, her own testimony, cross-examination of prosecution 
witnesses and closing arguments. The trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on a 
proffered request based on non-binding authority has neither infringed on 
Defendant's constitutional rights nor prejudiced the outcome of the case. 
Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the proffered jury instruction was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons more fully set forth above, Plaintiff and Appellee respectfully 
requests that this Court uphold the rulings of the trial court and affirm the 
conviction of Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON R. DRAKE (11155) 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE 
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